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<p>Who should set the agenda in a democracy—the majority or the minority? We address this question by studying public project provision, financing, and redistribution within democratic institutions. We show that the four features defining the following procedure are locally necessary, and together sufficient, for optimality: (i)&#xa0;there are two proposal-making rounds followed by a voting round (with majority rule); (ii)&#xa0;a member of the minority proposes first and a member of the majority counter-proposes; (iii)&#xa0;taxes are uniform; (iv)&#xa0;subsidies are fixed for agenda-setters. Our insights are compatible with the principle according to which minorities should have the first say in proposal-making.</p>

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Optimal democratic mechanisms: should minorities propose first?

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月27日

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  • Hans Gersbach,
  • Stephan Imhof,
  • Oriol Tejada

摘要

Who should set the agenda in a democracy—the majority or the minority? We address this question by studying public project provision, financing, and redistribution within democratic institutions. We show that the four features defining the following procedure are locally necessary, and together sufficient, for optimality: (i) there are two proposal-making rounds followed by a voting round (with majority rule); (ii) a member of the minority proposes first and a member of the majority counter-proposes; (iii) taxes are uniform; (iv) subsidies are fixed for agenda-setters. Our insights are compatible with the principle according to which minorities should have the first say in proposal-making.