<p>Classical decision-making theory focuses on how to make a good decision but ignores how to select an appropriate implementer to implement the final decision. This paper argues that open voting is a simple way to help identify the genuine supporters of a final decision and select the suitable implementer when all voters on a committee reveal their private opinions truthfully. However, we find that truth-telling incentives may not always hold in a transparent voting environment. In large committees, voters who perceive themselves as a minority may strategically support the policy they believe will prevail. This allows them to gain rent and potentially sabotage the policy implementation. As a result, the “shy voter effect” emerges, where individuals conceal their private opinions and conform to the majority, leading to failures in both policy and implementer selection under open voting. Nevertheless, open voting can still be effective for implementer selection in small committees where the “shy voter effect” is absent. However, small committees suffer from preference aggregation loss compared to larger ones. Thus, when applying open voting in committee decision-making, there is a trade-off between policy selection efficiency and implementation efficiency. When implementation efficiency is crucial, a small-sized committee with open voting is socially desirable. Finally, this paper explores decision rule designs to mitigate the impact of the “shy voter effect” on both policy and implementer selection.</p>