Scholarlink

<p>We study the classical reallocation problem (Shapley and Scarf in J Math Econ 1:23–37, 1974) and introduce a large class of exchange rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational on the domain of single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalizations of Gale’s top trading cycles: In each step, a subset of neighboring objects are available for exchange and the next subset of available objects may depend on the exchanges performed previously, where the neighborhood is defined by the order that justifies single-peakedness.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Neighborhood top trading cycles

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月22日

查看全文
  • Peng Liu

摘要

We study the classical reallocation problem (Shapley and Scarf in J Math Econ 1:23–37, 1974) and introduce a large class of exchange rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational on the domain of single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalizations of Gale’s top trading cycles: In each step, a subset of neighboring objects are available for exchange and the next subset of available objects may depend on the exchanges performed previously, where the neighborhood is defined by the order that justifies single-peakedness.