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<p>This paper considers an electoral system in which voters may approve any subset of options. We introduce the class of proportional threshold methods that select the subset of options whose share of approvals in the population meets or exceeds a certain threshold. We provide an axiomatic characterization of these methods using a principle of consistency between populations and profiles of approval voting ballots. A distinctive feature of our approach is to provide a geometric proof of this characterization result.</p>

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An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: a geometric approach

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月26日

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  • Susumu Cato,
  • Stéphane Gonzalez,
  • Eric Rémila,
  • Philippe Solal

摘要

This paper considers an electoral system in which voters may approve any subset of options. We introduce the class of proportional threshold methods that select the subset of options whose share of approvals in the population meets or exceeds a certain threshold. We provide an axiomatic characterization of these methods using a principle of consistency between populations and profiles of approval voting ballots. A distinctive feature of our approach is to provide a geometric proof of this characterization result.