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<p>Scientific sharing of agricultural water pricing in irrigation regions is essential for ensuring orderly irrigation activity and adjusting agricultural irrigation water demand. However, previous studies have failed to establish a flawless irrigation water price distribution system. The study indicates that the water pricing distribution in irrigation zones is primarily influenced by strategic negotiations among stakeholders, including farmers, local authorities, and water suppliers. Therefore, a tripartite bargaining game model is introduced into the field of agricultural water price sharing in irrigation areas. From a benefit value perspective, model parameters, such as deterrent capabilities, deterrence resistance capability, and discount factors, are defined. The agricultural water price sharing three-party model is formed to determine the allocation ratios among the three entities. Using the Yuanmou Bingjian Irrigation Area in Yunnan (2017–2022) as a case study, the average farm water rate sharing ratio is 20.18%, and the rate for Yuanmou County is 26.34%. An in-depth analysis of the results reveals that the model overcomes the limitations of previous irrigation water price models, which focused exclusively on economic efficiency. The new model factorizes in the bargaining process during the formulation of irrigation water prices, facilitating the practical implementation of pricing strategies.</p>

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Study of the game mechanism of agricultural water price sharing in irrigation areas

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月18日

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  • Cuimei Lv,
  • Zhichao Zhu,
  • Minhua Ling,
  • Qianqian Cao,
  • Yin Yu

摘要

Scientific sharing of agricultural water pricing in irrigation regions is essential for ensuring orderly irrigation activity and adjusting agricultural irrigation water demand. However, previous studies have failed to establish a flawless irrigation water price distribution system. The study indicates that the water pricing distribution in irrigation zones is primarily influenced by strategic negotiations among stakeholders, including farmers, local authorities, and water suppliers. Therefore, a tripartite bargaining game model is introduced into the field of agricultural water price sharing in irrigation areas. From a benefit value perspective, model parameters, such as deterrent capabilities, deterrence resistance capability, and discount factors, are defined. The agricultural water price sharing three-party model is formed to determine the allocation ratios among the three entities. Using the Yuanmou Bingjian Irrigation Area in Yunnan (2017–2022) as a case study, the average farm water rate sharing ratio is 20.18%, and the rate for Yuanmou County is 26.34%. An in-depth analysis of the results reveals that the model overcomes the limitations of previous irrigation water price models, which focused exclusively on economic efficiency. The new model factorizes in the bargaining process during the formulation of irrigation water prices, facilitating the practical implementation of pricing strategies.