<p>Kenya’s Environmental Management and Coordination (Amendment) Act (2015) mandates Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for mineral processing projects, yet evidence from Siaya County’s gold leaching sector suggests widespread non-compliance, raising critical questions about whether licensing frameworks translate into improved environmental practices. This study evaluates the effectiveness of Kenya’s licensing regime by examining whether licensing status, specifically EIA licenses and mineral dealers (processing) licenses, correlates with operational practices in cyanide handling, cyanidation wastewater treatment, and tailings management. Using purposive sampling based on operational scale, 15 gold leaching plants were assessed using structured key informant interviews with close-ended questions using an assisted questionnaire format, and Spearman’s correlation analysis was employed to examine relationships between licensing status and management practices. Results revealed that 86.7% of surveyed plants operated without mandatory EIAs, exploiting agent-based mineral licensing loopholes that allow multiple facilities to circumvent individual environmental obligations. Critically, no significant correlations emerged between licensing status and any measured practice; cyanide, cyanidation wastewater and tailings management practices (<i>p</i> &gt; 0.05 across all parameters), exposing Kenya’s regime as symbolic regulation that prioritizes procedural compliance over substantive environmental safeguards. These findings align with global artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) challenges, where licensing often fails to mitigate hazards. The study identifies three governance failures: (1) regulatory loopholes enabling systemic non-compliance, (2) ceremonial adoption of policies without implementation, and (3) fragmented oversight between environmental and mining agencies. To address these gaps, the study advocates for outcome-based licensing, e.g., tying permits to verified practices, hybrid governance integrating community monitoring, and technology-specific standards such as mandatory closed-loop systems. These reforms offer a transferable model for mineral-dependent economies, emphasizing enforceable compliance over bureaucratic formalities to achieve sustainable mining.</p>

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Does Licensing Matter? Cyanide Handling, Cyanidation Wastewater Treatment, and Tailings Management in Gold Leaching Plants in Siaya County, Kenya

  • Beth Akinyi Ayoo

摘要

Kenya’s Environmental Management and Coordination (Amendment) Act (2015) mandates Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for mineral processing projects, yet evidence from Siaya County’s gold leaching sector suggests widespread non-compliance, raising critical questions about whether licensing frameworks translate into improved environmental practices. This study evaluates the effectiveness of Kenya’s licensing regime by examining whether licensing status, specifically EIA licenses and mineral dealers (processing) licenses, correlates with operational practices in cyanide handling, cyanidation wastewater treatment, and tailings management. Using purposive sampling based on operational scale, 15 gold leaching plants were assessed using structured key informant interviews with close-ended questions using an assisted questionnaire format, and Spearman’s correlation analysis was employed to examine relationships between licensing status and management practices. Results revealed that 86.7% of surveyed plants operated without mandatory EIAs, exploiting agent-based mineral licensing loopholes that allow multiple facilities to circumvent individual environmental obligations. Critically, no significant correlations emerged between licensing status and any measured practice; cyanide, cyanidation wastewater and tailings management practices (p > 0.05 across all parameters), exposing Kenya’s regime as symbolic regulation that prioritizes procedural compliance over substantive environmental safeguards. These findings align with global artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) challenges, where licensing often fails to mitigate hazards. The study identifies three governance failures: (1) regulatory loopholes enabling systemic non-compliance, (2) ceremonial adoption of policies without implementation, and (3) fragmented oversight between environmental and mining agencies. To address these gaps, the study advocates for outcome-based licensing, e.g., tying permits to verified practices, hybrid governance integrating community monitoring, and technology-specific standards such as mandatory closed-loop systems. These reforms offer a transferable model for mineral-dependent economies, emphasizing enforceable compliance over bureaucratic formalities to achieve sustainable mining.