<p>This paper studies a <i>discounted</i> linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower stochastic differential game for regime switching diffusion in an infinite horizon. Within the <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <InlineMediaObject> <ImageObject Color="BlackWhite" FileRef="245_2025_10305_Article_IEq1.gif" Format="GIF" Height="16" Rendition="HTML" Resolution="72" Type="Linedraw" Width="29" /> </InlineMediaObject> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(L^{2,r}\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-stabilizability framework, we first, as a preliminary, establish the <i>global well-posedness</i> of infinite horizon linear stochastic differential equations and backward stochastic differential equations with Markov chains. Next, under the <i>uniform convexity condition</i> for LQ problems, we obtain an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium of the leader-follower game. By employing the so-called <i>four-step scheme</i>, the corresponding Hamiltonian systems for the two players are decoupled and then the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium admits a state feedback representation in terms of two new-type <i>algebraic Riccati equations</i> together with some certain <i>stabilizing condition</i>. Finally, we report a numerical example to illustrate our theoretical results, including the solutions to the Riccati equations, the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies, and the behavior of the corresponding state process.</p>

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Infinite Horizon Linear-Quadratic Leader-Follower Stochastic Differential Games for Regime Switching Diffusions

  • Kai Ding,
  • Siyu Lv,
  • Jie Xiong,
  • Xin Zhang

摘要

This paper studies a discounted linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower stochastic differential game for regime switching diffusion in an infinite horizon. Within the \(L^{2,r}\) -stabilizability framework, we first, as a preliminary, establish the global well-posedness of infinite horizon linear stochastic differential equations and backward stochastic differential equations with Markov chains. Next, under the uniform convexity condition for LQ problems, we obtain an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium of the leader-follower game. By employing the so-called four-step scheme, the corresponding Hamiltonian systems for the two players are decoupled and then the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium admits a state feedback representation in terms of two new-type algebraic Riccati equations together with some certain stabilizing condition. Finally, we report a numerical example to illustrate our theoretical results, including the solutions to the Riccati equations, the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies, and the behavior of the corresponding state process.