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<p>This paper studies the impact of the order of senders in a sequential Bayesian persuasion game on the receiver’s equilibrium utility. We find that it is always optimal for the receiver to put the more aligned sender before the less aligned sender. Comparative statics analysis shows that when we restrict to senders who are comparable (i.e., a sender is more aligned than the other sender), as the degree of misalignment between senders increases or as the number of senders increases, the receiver’s equilibrium utility may (weakly) decrease. In addition, we find that when senders are comparable, the sequential game performs no worse than the simultaneous game in terms of information disclosure.</p>

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Optimal sender ordering in sequential persuasion

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月29日

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  • Quan Li,
  • Kang Rong

摘要

This paper studies the impact of the order of senders in a sequential Bayesian persuasion game on the receiver’s equilibrium utility. We find that it is always optimal for the receiver to put the more aligned sender before the less aligned sender. Comparative statics analysis shows that when we restrict to senders who are comparable (i.e., a sender is more aligned than the other sender), as the degree of misalignment between senders increases or as the number of senders increases, the receiver’s equilibrium utility may (weakly) decrease. In addition, we find that when senders are comparable, the sequential game performs no worse than the simultaneous game in terms of information disclosure.