Scholarlink

<p>We study an agency model with two <i>independent</i> projects each of which is owned by a principal. Under exclusive agency, each principal uses a different agent, whereas under common agency, all principals use the same agent. A project’s outcome depends on the agent’s hidden effort. We show that, even in the absence of physical linkages between the projects, a principal benefits from <i>providing information</i> on her project outcome to the other principal under common agency (rather than benefiting from <i>receiving the information</i>), whereas no such benefits arise under exclusive agency. That is, under common agency, an information sharing principal can take advantage of the other principal’s using the shared information. As a result, sharing information becomes each principal’s dominant strategy, provided that the other principal uses the shared information in a Pareto-optimal way. We show that using a common agent is optimal when information can be shared.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Information alliance in common agency

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月15日

查看全文
  • Rafael Costa Lima,
  • Humberto Moreira,
  • Alexander Rodivilov,
  • Dongsoo Shin

摘要

We study an agency model with two independent projects each of which is owned by a principal. Under exclusive agency, each principal uses a different agent, whereas under common agency, all principals use the same agent. A project’s outcome depends on the agent’s hidden effort. We show that, even in the absence of physical linkages between the projects, a principal benefits from providing information on her project outcome to the other principal under common agency (rather than benefiting from receiving the information), whereas no such benefits arise under exclusive agency. That is, under common agency, an information sharing principal can take advantage of the other principal’s using the shared information. As a result, sharing information becomes each principal’s dominant strategy, provided that the other principal uses the shared information in a Pareto-optimal way. We show that using a common agent is optimal when information can be shared.