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<p>In a coordination game with multiple Pareto ordered equilibria and population uncertainty, we show that group size helps select a unique equilibrium, for reasons reminiscent of the global games literature. A critical mass phenomenon emerges at equilibrium. Group size has an emboldening effect on participants.</p>

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Group size as selection device

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月2日

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  • Francesco De Sinopoli,
  • Leo Ferraris,
  • Claudia Meroni

摘要

In a coordination game with multiple Pareto ordered equilibria and population uncertainty, we show that group size helps select a unique equilibrium, for reasons reminiscent of the global games literature. A critical mass phenomenon emerges at equilibrium. Group size has an emboldening effect on participants.