Scholarlink

<p>This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the <i>direct strategy profile</i> in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of an idealized large game. We show that, under a mild continuity condition, (i) direct strategy profiles constitute a convergent sequence of approximate equilibria as the number of players tends to infinity, and (ii) realizations of such strategy profiles also form a convergent sequence of (pure strategy) approximate equilibria with probability approaching one. Our findings provide a simple and decentralized approach for implementing equilibrium in large games, yielding outcomes that are asymptotically optimal both ex ante and ex post.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

The equilibrium properties of direct strategy profiles in games with many players

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月24日

查看全文
  • Hanping Xu,
  • Bin Wu,
  • Enxian Chen

摘要

This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the direct strategy profile in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of an idealized large game. We show that, under a mild continuity condition, (i) direct strategy profiles constitute a convergent sequence of approximate equilibria as the number of players tends to infinity, and (ii) realizations of such strategy profiles also form a convergent sequence of (pure strategy) approximate equilibria with probability approaching one. Our findings provide a simple and decentralized approach for implementing equilibrium in large games, yielding outcomes that are asymptotically optimal both ex ante and ex post.