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<p>We propose a novel mechanism to mitigate the provision of public bads in large groups. In the baseline case with centralized punishment, players choose their neighbors and having more neighbors brings benefits. Each player then decides whether to provide a public bad, which yields personal benefits but imposes costs on the entire group. A small chance exists that a player providing the public bad will be detected and punished. In the responsibility-sharing mechanism, when a player is caught providing the public bad, their neighbors are also punished. Our theoretical analysis and experimental results strongly support the effectiveness of this mechanism in promoting Pareto optimal outcomes. In addition, using another experimental treatment, we determine that the mechanism is less effective in the absence of complete feedback information.</p>

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Responsibility sharing in a public bad experiment

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月3日

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  • Simin He,
  • Xun Zhu,
  • Xinlu Zou

摘要

We propose a novel mechanism to mitigate the provision of public bads in large groups. In the baseline case with centralized punishment, players choose their neighbors and having more neighbors brings benefits. Each player then decides whether to provide a public bad, which yields personal benefits but imposes costs on the entire group. A small chance exists that a player providing the public bad will be detected and punished. In the responsibility-sharing mechanism, when a player is caught providing the public bad, their neighbors are also punished. Our theoretical analysis and experimental results strongly support the effectiveness of this mechanism in promoting Pareto optimal outcomes. In addition, using another experimental treatment, we determine that the mechanism is less effective in the absence of complete feedback information.