Scholarlink

<p>This paper examines players’ behavior in Bayesian games when they may have incorrect beliefs about their opponents’ types. Their behavior can be characterized by a type distribution function and a belief function if their actions across games satisfy four conditions: Dominance, Monotonicity, Continuity, and Linearity. Both the type distribution function and players’ shared belief can be identified from their aggregate behavior across games. The analyst can also test if players’ beliefs are accurate with action data only.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Revealed types and beliefs in bayesian games

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月30日

查看全文
  • Mengke Wang

摘要

This paper examines players’ behavior in Bayesian games when they may have incorrect beliefs about their opponents’ types. Their behavior can be characterized by a type distribution function and a belief function if their actions across games satisfy four conditions: Dominance, Monotonicity, Continuity, and Linearity. Both the type distribution function and players’ shared belief can be identified from their aggregate behavior across games. The analyst can also test if players’ beliefs are accurate with action data only.