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<p>We investigate experimentally the role of costly information acquisition as a selection mechanism in coordination games with incomplete information. We find that subjects’ behavior, conditional on their precision choice, varies along two dimensions. Higher precision choices lead to more coordination attempts (and successful coordination) and more predictable strategies than low precision choices. These differences in behavior are absent when information precision is exogenous, suggesting that information choices act as a selection device. We find that individual precision choices are stable and unaffected by others’ past precision choices from the beginning of the experiment, suggesting that that selection is not driven by strategic anticipation but rather by unobserved heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences. We show that these effects have significant payoff consequences.</p>

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Selection through information acquisition in coordination games

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月12日

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  • Michal Szkup,
  • Isabel Trevino

摘要

We investigate experimentally the role of costly information acquisition as a selection mechanism in coordination games with incomplete information. We find that subjects’ behavior, conditional on their precision choice, varies along two dimensions. Higher precision choices lead to more coordination attempts (and successful coordination) and more predictable strategies than low precision choices. These differences in behavior are absent when information precision is exogenous, suggesting that information choices act as a selection device. We find that individual precision choices are stable and unaffected by others’ past precision choices from the beginning of the experiment, suggesting that that selection is not driven by strategic anticipation but rather by unobserved heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences. We show that these effects have significant payoff consequences.