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<p>For simple games with a variable electorate, the paper presents two axiomatization results on two power indices: the Deegan–Packel index and the Holler–Packel index. Besides the well-known axiom of efficiency, axioms based on partnership equivalence and the entry of a new voter are taken into account. Only one axiom changes from one axiomatization to the next on how the two power indices under consideration cope with the entry of a new voter.</p>

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The Deegan–Packel and Holler–Packel indices: partnership equivalence and the entry of a new voter

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月25日

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  • Adin Safokem,
  • Aurélien Mekuko Yonta,
  • Issofa Moyouwou

摘要

For simple games with a variable electorate, the paper presents two axiomatization results on two power indices: the Deegan–Packel index and the Holler–Packel index. Besides the well-known axiom of efficiency, axioms based on partnership equivalence and the entry of a new voter are taken into account. Only one axiom changes from one axiomatization to the next on how the two power indices under consideration cope with the entry of a new voter.