<p>In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. Each mechanism satisfies a distinct set of reasonable properties related to fairness and stability, which serve to axiomatically characterize them.</p>

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The museum pass problem with consortia

  • Juan Carlos Gonçalves-Dosantos,
  • Ricardo Martínez,
  • Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano

摘要

In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. Each mechanism satisfies a distinct set of reasonable properties related to fairness and stability, which serve to axiomatically characterize them.