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<p>The paper explores the role of a pre-existing language in strategic communication. A <i>language game</i> is a sender-receiver game that is combined with a language. The language is modeled as a pure receiver strategy. It is a <i>common language</i> if sent (intended) messages coincide with received (interpreted) messages; otherwise there is <i>language uncertainty</i>. The sender deliberates by iterating pure-strategy best replies, starting from the language, while provisionally dropping unused messages. This process converges to a limit set of strategies in a reduced game. A minimal enlargement of this limit set contains a best reply to every belief concentrated on it, and hence supports an equilibrium of the reduced game. With a common language this equilibrium can be extended to the entire game by restoring dropped messages and is then a <i>language equilibrium</i>. The paper proposes a generalization to games with language uncertainty. Every finite language game has a language equilibrium, which predicts <i>language use</i>, i.e., how messages formulated in the pre-existing language are deployed and interpreted by strategic agents in equilibrium.</p>

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Meaning in communication games

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月21日

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  • Andreas Blume

摘要

The paper explores the role of a pre-existing language in strategic communication. A language game is a sender-receiver game that is combined with a language. The language is modeled as a pure receiver strategy. It is a common language if sent (intended) messages coincide with received (interpreted) messages; otherwise there is language uncertainty. The sender deliberates by iterating pure-strategy best replies, starting from the language, while provisionally dropping unused messages. This process converges to a limit set of strategies in a reduced game. A minimal enlargement of this limit set contains a best reply to every belief concentrated on it, and hence supports an equilibrium of the reduced game. With a common language this equilibrium can be extended to the entire game by restoring dropped messages and is then a language equilibrium. The paper proposes a generalization to games with language uncertainty. Every finite language game has a language equilibrium, which predicts language use, i.e., how messages formulated in the pre-existing language are deployed and interpreted by strategic agents in equilibrium.