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<p>Revisiting the setting of Kochov and Song (<CitationRef CitationID="CR10">2023</CitationRef>), we study infinitely repeated games in which the players’ rates of time preference may evolve endogenously in the course of the game. Our goal is to establish a folk theorem without the assumption of observable mixtures made in the earlier paper. To that end, we identify a new sufficient condition on preferences which holds automatically in the standard case of time separable utilities and a common discount factor, while being generic in ours.</p>

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A folk theorem with unobservable mixtures and endogenous discounting

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月15日

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  • Asen Kochov,
  • Yangwei Song

摘要

Revisiting the setting of Kochov and Song (2023), we study infinitely repeated games in which the players’ rates of time preference may evolve endogenously in the course of the game. Our goal is to establish a folk theorem without the assumption of observable mixtures made in the earlier paper. To that end, we identify a new sufficient condition on preferences which holds automatically in the standard case of time separable utilities and a common discount factor, while being generic in ours.