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<p>We study the problem of assigning packages of objects to agents with money. We allow agents to have utility functions that exhibit income effects or face hard budget constraints. It is already known that either income effects or hard budget constraints lead to the non-existence of a rule satisfying <i>strategy-proofness</i>, <i>Pareto efficiency</i>, <i>individual rationality</i>, and <i>no subsidy</i> (Dobzinski et al. in Games Econ Behav 74(2):486–503, 2012; Kazumura and Serizawa in Soc Choice Welf 47(3):633–663, 2016; Baisa in Theor Econ 15(1):361–413, 2020; Malik and Mishra in J Econ Theory 191:105128, 2021 etc.). Given such negative results, we investigate whether rules can satisfy <i>non-obvious manipulability</i> (Troyan and Morrill in J Econ Theory 185:104970, 2020)—an incentive property weaker than <i>strategy-proofness</i>—together with the other three properties. First, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for a rule that satisfies <i>Pareto efficiency</i>, <i>individual rationality</i>, and <i>no subsidy</i> to also satisfy <i>non-obvious manipulability</i>. Using this result, we show that a modification of a (truncated) pay-as-bid rule, as well as certain Walrasian rules, satisfies all four properties.</p>

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Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月2日

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  • Hiroki Shinozaki

摘要

We study the problem of assigning packages of objects to agents with money. We allow agents to have utility functions that exhibit income effects or face hard budget constraints. It is already known that either income effects or hard budget constraints lead to the non-existence of a rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy (Dobzinski et al. in Games Econ Behav 74(2):486–503, 2012; Kazumura and Serizawa in Soc Choice Welf 47(3):633–663, 2016; Baisa in Theor Econ 15(1):361–413, 2020; Malik and Mishra in J Econ Theory 191:105128, 2021 etc.). Given such negative results, we investigate whether rules can satisfy non-obvious manipulability (Troyan and Morrill in J Econ Theory 185:104970, 2020)—an incentive property weaker than strategy-proofness—together with the other three properties. First, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for a rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy to also satisfy non-obvious manipulability. Using this result, we show that a modification of a (truncated) pay-as-bid rule, as well as certain Walrasian rules, satisfies all four properties.