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<p>We present a new axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik power index based on three axioms. The central axiom—<b>occasional subgame-consistency on average</b> (<b>OSCoA</b>)—requires the power of a player to coincide with the average of his power in one-player-out subgames, for <i>just one</i> game <i>v</i> on any given support (which must be essential for the game). The choice of <i>v</i> may be player-dependent but <i>v</i> must have no veto players. The other two axioms are the standard <b>Transfer</b> and <b>Dummy</b>. We also formulate some stronger variants of <b>OSCoA</b> that do not explicitly require the support of <i>v</i> as above to be essential.</p>

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On subgame consistency of the Shapley-Shubik power index

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月13日

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  • Ori Haimanko

摘要

We present a new axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik power index based on three axioms. The central axiom—occasional subgame-consistency on average (OSCoA)—requires the power of a player to coincide with the average of his power in one-player-out subgames, for just one game v on any given support (which must be essential for the game). The choice of v may be player-dependent but v must have no veto players. The other two axioms are the standard Transfer and Dummy. We also formulate some stronger variants of OSCoA that do not explicitly require the support of v as above to be essential.