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<p>Blending in with others is a possible self-serving motivation when people participate in cooperative situations. We use this motivation to formulate a corresponding fairness principle, combine it with rather weak standard axioms from cooperative game theory, and show that it leads to equal split of coalitional gains. The same normative principles characterize this solution when only cohesive games (where it is optimal for the coalition of all players to form) are considered.</p>

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Blend-in fairness and equal split

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月26日

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  • Dinko Dimitrov,
  • Ching-jen Sun

摘要

Blending in with others is a possible self-serving motivation when people participate in cooperative situations. We use this motivation to formulate a corresponding fairness principle, combine it with rather weak standard axioms from cooperative game theory, and show that it leads to equal split of coalitional gains. The same normative principles characterize this solution when only cohesive games (where it is optimal for the coalition of all players to form) are considered.