<p>This paper introduces a novel framework for transferable utility games that incorporates permission relationships between a priori unions of players. This framework is particularly well-suited for modeling liability situations where groups of individuals cause harm through a series of wrongful actions. We propose the <i>permission-Owen value</i>, a new allocation rule that merges the (conjunctive) permission value with the Owen value, and apply it to these liability situations. Finally, we provide several axiomatic characterizations of the permission-Owen value, grounded in principles of marginality and fairness.</p>

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The permission-Owen value: axiomatization and application to liability situations

  • Takaaki Abe,
  • David Lowing,
  • Satoshi Nakada,
  • Kevin Techer

摘要

This paper introduces a novel framework for transferable utility games that incorporates permission relationships between a priori unions of players. This framework is particularly well-suited for modeling liability situations where groups of individuals cause harm through a series of wrongful actions. We propose the permission-Owen value, a new allocation rule that merges the (conjunctive) permission value with the Owen value, and apply it to these liability situations. Finally, we provide several axiomatic characterizations of the permission-Owen value, grounded in principles of marginality and fairness.