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<p>This paper examines whether contemporary generative artificial intelligence (GAI), especially large language models (LLMs), can be regarded as a “cognitive subject” in the epistemic sense relevant to the production and endorsement of knowledge claims. GAI systems increasingly participate in writing, research, and decision-making workflows and can display striking competence in information processing and task-directed problem solving. Yet, the thesis that GAI is a cognitive subject is stronger than the observation that GAI contributes as a cognitive tool. Therefore, we propose an explicit set of necessary and sufficient conditions for cognitive subjecthood and evaluate each condition in light of recent philosophical and empirical scholarship. The analysis supports a two-part conclusion: (i) present-day GAI can reasonably be described as a cognitively significant <i>contributor</i> to knowledge production, but (ii) it does not satisfy the conditions for cognitive <i>subjecthood</i>, largely because robust intentionality, metacognitive self-representation, and consciousness-related indicator properties are not established.</p>

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Can generative artificial intelligence be considered a cognitive subject? An analytic analysis

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  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月19日

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  • Steven S. Gouveia,
  • Yinchun Wang

摘要

This paper examines whether contemporary generative artificial intelligence (GAI), especially large language models (LLMs), can be regarded as a “cognitive subject” in the epistemic sense relevant to the production and endorsement of knowledge claims. GAI systems increasingly participate in writing, research, and decision-making workflows and can display striking competence in information processing and task-directed problem solving. Yet, the thesis that GAI is a cognitive subject is stronger than the observation that GAI contributes as a cognitive tool. Therefore, we propose an explicit set of necessary and sufficient conditions for cognitive subjecthood and evaluate each condition in light of recent philosophical and empirical scholarship. The analysis supports a two-part conclusion: (i) present-day GAI can reasonably be described as a cognitively significant contributor to knowledge production, but (ii) it does not satisfy the conditions for cognitive subjecthood, largely because robust intentionality, metacognitive self-representation, and consciousness-related indicator properties are not established.