<p>This article examines the philosophical, ethical, and economic dimensions of artificial systems that are capable of experiencing suffering or convincingly simulating it. Drawing on religious traditions, classical and contemporary philosophy, neuroscience, and research in artificial intelligence, the author argues that the capacity to suffer is not only a moral threshold but also a factor of technological and economic value. Through an interdisciplinary analysis, this paper shows how suffering has historically shaped the recognition of moral status and applies this approach to modern AI systems. It considers the implications of machines that emulate emotional responsiveness, the market demand for affective interfaces, and the ethical dilemmas linked to artificial consciousness. Special attention is given to hybrid AI systems based on biological neurons (for example, DishBrain), as well as to the precautionary principle proposed by philosophers such as Thomas Metzinger. This article concludes that even the hypothetical possibility of machine suffering requires us to rethink the boundaries of moral inclusion and the politics of recognition in the age of intelligent machines.</p>