<p>At the heart of what may be the most intimate ethical dilemma of our time lies the Lovebot—a Sexdoll driven by sophisticated artificial intelligence that gives it the ability to engage in social relationships. This socio-intelligent capability raises critical ethical and existential questions about the nature and purpose of human relationships and, more fundamentally, about the very essence of what it means to be human. Secular thinkers are divided on the subject: some welcome Lovebots enthusiastically, while others voice grave concerns that they threaten the human condition. Surprisingly, some Jewish thinkers have justified their use by referencing a midrash about a Golem created for companionship. It is my thesis, however, that this line of reasoning is deeply mistaken; for it is not enough to simply find an analogous case to make a moral determination. Rather, analogies must be assessed within the greater weltanschauung of a thick moral framework. Jewish thought provides just such a framework, consisting of four pillars: narratives, norms, a guiding normative principle, and an ultimate telos toward which we strive. Applying this framework to the question of Lovebots will demonstrate that relationships with automatons are antithetical to each of these pillars, undermining the human condition both ethically and existentially. This analysis will not only render a Jewish response to the issue, but will reinforce the secular critique of Human–Lovebot relations and provide a novel counterargument to secular justifications for their permissibility.</p>

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It is not good for man to be alone: I will make him a Lovebot?

  • Mois Navon

摘要

At the heart of what may be the most intimate ethical dilemma of our time lies the Lovebot—a Sexdoll driven by sophisticated artificial intelligence that gives it the ability to engage in social relationships. This socio-intelligent capability raises critical ethical and existential questions about the nature and purpose of human relationships and, more fundamentally, about the very essence of what it means to be human. Secular thinkers are divided on the subject: some welcome Lovebots enthusiastically, while others voice grave concerns that they threaten the human condition. Surprisingly, some Jewish thinkers have justified their use by referencing a midrash about a Golem created for companionship. It is my thesis, however, that this line of reasoning is deeply mistaken; for it is not enough to simply find an analogous case to make a moral determination. Rather, analogies must be assessed within the greater weltanschauung of a thick moral framework. Jewish thought provides just such a framework, consisting of four pillars: narratives, norms, a guiding normative principle, and an ultimate telos toward which we strive. Applying this framework to the question of Lovebots will demonstrate that relationships with automatons are antithetical to each of these pillars, undermining the human condition both ethically and existentially. This analysis will not only render a Jewish response to the issue, but will reinforce the secular critique of Human–Lovebot relations and provide a novel counterargument to secular justifications for their permissibility.