Discussion of Chinese policies on digital governance, development, and surveillance in general, as well as the Social Credit System in particular, have been described using the terminology Digital Leninism. The purpose of this paper is to explicate the nature of this term to re-evaluate its foundational principles. Within the original context, Digital Leninism was coined in 2016 by Sebastian Heilmann of the Mercator Institute for China Studies to interpret Chinese digital policies within the environment of the authoritarian one-party policies of the Chinese Communist Party led by Chairman Xi Jinping. Since then, the term has become popular in academic discourse. In general, the definition of Digital Leninism which generally used in academic literature is one, where digital technology is focused on social governance while simultaneously maintaining a strong security perspective. Particularly within the frame of Xi’s administration utilizing cutting-edge digital technologies for algorithmic governance. It is, therefore, seemingly used exclusively in a Chinese context. However, although alluding to Leninist thought via the inclusion of its namesake in the two-word term, Heilmann’s original formulation lacks any Leninist ideological underpinning. In short, the Leninist connection in the original formulation is as basic as the combination of the Chinese state's Leninist background with authoritarian practices in cyberspace. We would, therefore, argue that Heilmann’s original formulation is simply another stand-in for the more broadly applicable term digital authoritarianism. Meanwhile our adjustment of Heilmann’s theory sets to universalise the notion out of its unnecessary Chinese context through the application of Lenin’s ideological worldview, specifically by looking at class consciousness as a fundamental pillar of digital governance within a digital Leninist system. In doing so we are able to provide a potential insight into the internal logic of the Chinese Communist Party in its endeavours to employ advanced digital monitoring, manipulation, and control. Simultaneously using this reformulated Digital Leninism to provide a better rationale for the development of Social Credit Systems in a Chinese environment as one example policy. To be sure, this paper is not attempting to issue a cause-all end-all argument for the development of Social Credit Systems as deriving from the revaluated notion of Digital Leninism. Instead, this endeavour aims to add depth, where before there was only a superficial framework by placing Digital Leninism within a line of policies implemented by a Leninist vanguard party to remain in control of a population which has not yet transitioned out of false consciousness. Occupying a new policy space, with an orthodox theoretical underpinning, at the intersection of the real world and cyberspace, a space created through the advancement of technology.

Reformulating Digital Leninism: a response to Sebastian Heilmann’s notions on digital governance in China

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发表日期：

2025年6月9日

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Eco Hamersma

摘要

Discussion of Chinese policies on digital governance, development, and surveillance in general, as well as the Social Credit System in particular, have been described using the terminology Digital Leninism. The purpose of this paper is to explicate the nature of this term to re-evaluate its foundational principles. Within the original context, Digital Leninism was coined in 2016 by Sebastian Heilmann of the Mercator Institute for China Studies to interpret Chinese digital policies within the environment of the authoritarian one-party policies of the Chinese Communist Party led by Chairman Xi Jinping. Since then, the term has become popular in academic discourse. In general, the definition of Digital Leninism which generally used in academic literature is one, where digital technology is focused on social governance while simultaneously maintaining a strong security perspective. Particularly within the frame of Xi’s administration utilizing cutting-edge digital technologies for algorithmic governance. It is, therefore, seemingly used exclusively in a Chinese context. However, although alluding to Leninist thought via the inclusion of its namesake in the two-word term, Heilmann’s original formulation lacks any Leninist ideological underpinning. In short, the Leninist connection in the original formulation is as basic as the combination of the Chinese state's Leninist background with authoritarian practices in cyberspace. We would, therefore, argue that Heilmann’s original formulation is simply another stand-in for the more broadly applicable term digital authoritarianism. Meanwhile our adjustment of Heilmann’s theory sets to universalise the notion out of its unnecessary Chinese context through the application of Lenin’s ideological worldview, specifically by looking at class consciousness as a fundamental pillar of digital governance within a digital Leninist system. In doing so we are able to provide a potential insight into the internal logic of the Chinese Communist Party in its endeavours to employ advanced digital monitoring, manipulation, and control. Simultaneously using this reformulated Digital Leninism to provide a better rationale for the development of Social Credit Systems in a Chinese environment as one example policy. To be sure, this paper is not attempting to issue a cause-all end-all argument for the development of Social Credit Systems as deriving from the revaluated notion of Digital Leninism. Instead, this endeavour aims to add depth, where before there was only a superficial framework by placing Digital Leninism within a line of policies implemented by a Leninist vanguard party to remain in control of a population which has not yet transitioned out of false consciousness. Occupying a new policy space, with an orthodox theoretical underpinning, at the intersection of the real world and cyberspace, a space created through the advancement of technology.